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Hobbes’ account of politics, law and obligation has long been read, especially by 
realists in international affairs, as leaving no space for international law or institutions. 
This paper argues that a more nuanced reading of Hobbes’ ideas about law and politics 
provides support for not only a defence of international law but a defence of a 
(chastened) global constitution. Hobbes’ constitutionalism does not derive from a 
separation or balance of powers but on two other elements of constitutionalism: the 
importance of the individual and the centrality of law. The paper proceeds as follows: 
The first section locates Hobbes theory of law in relation to his theory of authority, 
drawing on David Dyzenhaus’s emphasis on the rule of law in Hobbes. The second 
section draws on theorists such as Larry May to find a defence of international law and 
institutions, what I call international constitutionalism. The third section turns to 
Richard Flathman’s interpretation of Hobbes as a theorist of liberal self-making, 
suggesting how his insights can be applied globally. The conclusion brings these 
thoughts to bear on the relevance of Hobbes for global law and politics.  
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Introduction 
 
 According to scholars of International Relations (IR), Hobbes has long been the 
archetypical realist. This view usually relies on two quote from Leviathan, both from the 13
th
 
Chapter of Book I: First, the idea that life in the state of nature is ‘nasty, brutish, and short’, 
i.e. without some authority structure individuals will simply pursue their interests with no 
regard for rules of laws (Hobbes 1968 [1651], pp. 186); second, the infamous sentence, also 
from Leviathan, in which Hobbes claims that sovereign political communities are no more 
than ‘gladiators’ pointing their weapons at each other (Hobbes 1968 [1651], pp. 187-188). 
Realists see here a Hobbes who reinforces their view that the international order is an 
anarchic one with no place for institutions and laws.  
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 As with any author, a simplistic reading is often based on the interpretative 
assumptions brought to the text, a failure to read more widely than a single quote, or a 
disciplinary background that selectively explores a few themes rather than a wider argument. 
All of these background conditions can be found in the IR reading of Hobbes. The fault is not 
only with realists, however, but with critics of realism as well.1   Certainly, there are 
dimensions of Hobbes’ thought that lend themselves to such a reading. Hobbes did indeed see 
political life as a constant struggle to ensure peace by creating a powerful sovereign.  
 In this article, I suggest an alternative reading of Hobbes, one that finds in his work a 
defence of both international law and global constitutionalism. This reading relies on 
interpretations of Hobbes from David Dyzenhaus, Larry May and Richard Flathman. 
Dyzenhaus has argued in a number of places that Hobbes should be read as a theorist of 
constitutionalism because of the strong emphasis on the rule of law in his framework. May’s 
reading of Hobbes theory of constitutional contract and equity point to how he can be read as 
defender of an international legal and institutional order. Flathman argues for a Hobbes 
whose focus on the individual results in a powerful foundation for an alternative international 
order. From each one of these theorists (supplemented by a few others), I develop an account 
of Hobbes as a theorist of global constitutionalism, one whose insights into the intersection of 
law and politics in any political order points to a new way of seeing the global constitutional 
order.  
International law relies on the interests of states (Koskenniemi 2005). The origins of 
this tradition can be found in numerous places, from the raison d’etat of Machiavelli to the 
idealism of Hegel. This statism parallels the statism of realism, making both subject to a 
failure to take into account the individual person’s role in international and global affairs. Of 
course, practically, the global level prevents us from seeing and conceptualizing the 
individual, much less finding any political agency for individuals. Alternatives to this statist 
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international legal order have emerged in recent years. The first can be found in the effort to 
re-envision international law and politics through cosmopolitanism. This approach focuses on 
the individual as the primary point of consideration in the construction of alternative political 
orders at the global level. Cosmopolitanism can be found across a range of different 
philosophical and political theorists. Perhaps the most influential in those seeking to locate a 
cosmopolitan orientation through international law can be found in the figure of Immanuel 
Kant (Brown 2009, Habermas 2006). There is a strong individualist orientation in 
cosmopolitanism. And, as with Hobbes, Kant is often located in a particular tradition of 
thought within IR, one that is alternatively labelled idealist, utopian or liberal. Indeed, one 
critique of this literature is that it fails to locate cosmopolitan potential in actual international 
legal and political practices.2  
 The second comes through the literature on global constitutionalism. Global 
constitutionalism argues that there exist emerging patterns and practices in international law 
and politics that can be read as instances of constitutionalism, broadly defined. These new 
practices and patterns can be found in a renewed emphasis on the rule of law; the creation of 
new judicial institutions; calls for the separation of powers in international institutional 
frameworks; and the role of protest and revolutionary actions by non-state actors in response 
to the powers of states and international organizations. Global constitutionalism finds space 
for the individual in the global order in ways that traditional international fails to do. It is a 
normative framework for re-envisioning international law and politics.  
 Hobbes provides resources for thinking about an individualist global order that does 
not fall victim to the utopianism of much of cosmopolitan thinking but can be located in a 
constitutional framing. To make this Hobbesian alternative more concrete, I propose here a 
chastened global constitutionalism, borrowing the idea of chastened individualism from 
Flathman’s reading of Hobbes. Hobbes is not normally considered a theorist of 
4 
 
constitutionalism; his aversion to dividing sovereignty makes ideas such as separation and 
balance of powers less amenable to a Hobbesian account. But his writing on law (Dyzenhaus 
and Poole 2012) make him a useful theorist of a political order that is essentially legal. And, 
his focus on peace, a focus often ignored by realist interpreters, makes him directly relevant 
for conceptualizing both international and global constitutionalism. The combination of his 
legalism and liberalism make Hobbes a surprisingly important and useful theorist for 
articulating one version of global constitutionalism.  
 The article proceeds as follows: The first section provides a reading of Hobbes’ key 
arguments that highlights the importance of law and individualism, drawing on the work of 
David Dyzenhaus. The next section turns to Hobbes as a theorist of international law and 
institutions, what I call international constitutionalism, through Larry May’s recent reading of 
his work. The section that follows turns to the individualism of Richard Flathman’s reading 
of Hobbes, one which contributes to seeing the role of individuals as self-makers. This leads 
me to the conclusion in which I highlight the importance of law making in global 
constitutionalism.  Rather than focusing on judicial activism as much of the literature on 
global constitutionalism does, I conclude with an emphasis on law making, something that 
theorists of global constitutionalism need to explore in more depth. Hobbes’ individualism 
and legalism provide resources for highlighting this more neglected dimension of the current 
and future global order.  
Authority and Law  
Let me start by saying something about Hobbes ideas concerning authority, for his 
theoretical apparatus is, I would argue, largely about the way in which we can justify an 
authority structure.3  As is well known, in Leviathan (1651) Hobbes sought to develop an 
argument that would explain why individuals should abdicate their rights to a powerful 
sovereign. Hobbes argued that without the Leviathan society could not function. Not only 
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would social and political norms be overridden, normal social intercourse and even language 
would not be possible. While he emphasized the sovereign’s absolute authority, it is 
important to remember that Hobbes’ ideas of governance and authority are grounded in a 
liberal conception of the human person, that is, one that relies upon the rights of individual 
persons (Strauss 1936). The nature of the human person, however, produces the need for a 
sovereign to whom those rights will be abdicated. Those individuals pursue power in order to 
protect themselves since they have an equal ability to kill each other (Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 
183). This description of the human person leads Hobbes to propose a series of natural laws, 
the first two of which are the most important: First, every man seeks peace. Second, every 
man will defend himself (Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 190-193).  The result of these natural laws is 
that man must submit to a sovereign authority that will ensure the protection of all.   
That sovereign has authority over all members of the society, the result of a contract 
of sorts among individuals in a society. That contractual relationship leads members to create 
an authority to which they owe their allegiance. That authority manifests itself in the ability 
of the sovereign to issue commands. Commands are orders expressive of the will of the 
sovereign and are authoritative for this reason. Laws derive their force from being commands 
of the sovereign which Hobbes differentiates from counsels, which are orders to obey based 
on reasons for what would be good for the individual (Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 303).4 This 
distinction is central to Hobbes’ conception of obligation. I am obliged to follow the dictates 
of the sovereign not because he gives me reasons to do so, but simply because he has ordered 
me to do so. If the sovereign is forced to justify his orders and debate with individuals, then 
his authority is weakened.  This obligation to obey the sovereign is, ultimately, grounded in 
Hobbes’ natural law arguments – obedience is necessary to protect us from each other, a 
point that arises from Hobbes’ natural laws, particularly the first two.   But, once we have 
entered into the contract with the sovereign, we no longer need to have our obedience 
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justified by reference to those reasons but simply because the sovereign wishes it to be that 
way.5  
Authority is not a simple matter for Hobbes, for it must both make sense of why 
individuals should obey and also how to make authority concrete. Law is the means by which 
both tasks are accomplished. That is, a law governed order is one that prevents an authority 
figure from governing without any limits or whimsically, hence respecting the agency of the 
individual as in need of some order, and it also makes specific the ways in which commands 
come about. Hobbes defines law as: ‘A Law is the Command of him, or them that have the 
Soveraign Power, given to those that be his or their Subjects, declaring Publickly, and plainly 
what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do’ (Hobbes 1971 [1681]: 71). 
So, while the realist picture of Hobbes described in the opening pages of this article would 
imply that nothing can limit the sovereign power, law, while not a limit on authority, is 
fundamental for making authority work.  
While law makes authority function, Hobbes does not see a benefit in limiting that 
authority. To do so is to allow the possibility of division and ultimately war. As he states 
clearly in one of his earlier works, Elements of the Law: ‘The division of sovereignty, either 
worketh no effect, to the taking away of simple subjection, or introduceth war; wherein the 
private sword hath place again’ (Hobbes 2008 [1640]: 116). The passages that follow, 
though, do leave space for a pragmatic division of labour in governing, noting that there is 
space for monarchy, aristocracy and democracy in the practice of government (ibid). This 
division is not designed to limit the sovereign but to make it possible for the sovereign to 
govern in order that a political order can work effectively to accomplish that most important 
of aims: the creation of peace. 6 
Hobbes’ understanding of law, then, is directly related to his understanding of 
authority and sovereignty. He defines law by means of sovereignty, as in Leviathan, Chapter 
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26, Of Civil Law: ‘CIVIL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-
Wealth hath commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make 
use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say of what is contrary, and what is 
not contrary to Rule’ (Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 312). As he goes on to explain the Common-
wealth is nothing but the Representative, which is the Sovereign. This view of law stands in 
contrast to two alternatives. First, the natural law tradition posits that law derives from the 
application of right reason to the human condition. Hobbes begins his reflections on law 
through an engagement with the idea of natural law. In Leviathan, Chapters 13 and 14 
elaborate the human condition and the resulting natural laws. And, in Chapter 26 in which he 
explains the civil law, Hobbes states that ‘The Law of Nature, and the Civil Law, contain 
each other, and are of equall extent’ (Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 314). Martin Loughlin argues that 
because Hobbes saw himself as providing a justification for authority and law, he needed to 
address natural law in some way. Rather than re-establishing natural law in its traditional 
form as the basis for civil law, Loughlin suggests that ‘Hobbes made natural law a central 
focus of his work… in order to expose its errors and rework its precepts  for the purpose of 
rebuilding the authority of sovereign will’ (Loughlin 2012: 12). 
The second alternative to Hobbes’ account is that of the common law. In both 
Leviathan, Chapter 26 and in the Dialogue, Hobbes argues that the history of a custom or the 
wisdom of judges cannot be the basis for law or our obligation to obey it. Against those who 
would argue that the ancient heritage of law is what gives it validity, Hobbes states: ‘When 
long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is no the Length of Time that maketh the 
Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an 
argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein’ 
(Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 313). And, further, in response to Edward Coke’s defense of the role 
of the long study and wisdom of the common lawyer: 
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For it is possible long study may encrease, and conform erroneous 
Sentences; and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the 
greater is the ruine; and of those that study, and observe with equall time, 
and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: 
and there it is not that Juris prudientia, or wisdom of subordinate Judges; 
but the Reason of this our Artificall Man the Common-wealth, and his 
Command that maketh the Law: And the Common-wealth being in their 
Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in 
the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, 
or alteration, to take it away. Hobbes 1968[1651]|: 317 
 
Neither history nor wisdom can give the common law the authority that it deserves, but only 
the sovereign legislator can give it that authority. 
 Reflecting on the authority of law leads one to the question of constitutionalism. For 
some, Hobbes is a constitutional theorist, for he gives a strong defense of the rule of law. 
David Dyzenhaus, for instance, argues that Hobbes’ constitutional theory is ‘a theory of 
fundamental principles of legality which does not fit neatly into our contemporary categories 
of legal positivism and natural law. Indeed, it seems to me that we can make better sense of 
Hobbes as an early theorist of the rule of law tradition, whose members hold that the ultimate 
constitution of political order is legal and not political’ (Dyzenhaus 2010: 456). Those who 
see constitutional as about a separation and balance of powers would not see Hobbes as a 
theorist within this tradition, but Dyzenhaus and others who privilege the rule of law as the 
primary criterion of a constitutional order can find in Hobbes resources to defend their 
position.  
 Dyzenhaus argues that Hobbes also provides a resource for defending an international 
rule of law. Unlike the majority of interpretations of Hobbes on international affairs, 
Dyzenhaus focuses on the centrality of law in Hobbes account of all political life, domestic 
and international. He points to the fact that the existence of the sovereign results not from an 
aggrandizement of power by any individual but that it results from a fundamentally legal 
project: ‘Submission to a sovereign is not submission to the arbitrary rule of one person. It is 
submission to the rule of one artificial person whose identity is legally constituted and who 
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not only rules through law but in accordance with the rule of law. Submission to sovereignty 
is ultimately submission to the rule of law’ (Dyzenhaus 2014: 55). While not suggesting that 
the international community of states has created a sovereign leviathan by which they can be 
governed, Dyzenhaus does propose that the international laws made by states bind them in 
some fundamental way. They are bound because by accepting their status as states, they have 
accepted the fact that they must act in accordance with and justify their arguments in terms of 
international laws. The act of making is not an act of making the sovereign that the domestic 
community has undertaken but the act of creating a body of laws that define the nature of the 
international order. 
 Hobbes’ understanding of law relies on his understanding of sovereign authority. The 
sovereign, the artificial person created by the community, serves as the legislator, executive 
and judiciary. That sovereign must retain all these roles in one to prevent the anarchy and war 
that would result from individuals pursuing their own interests. And, while Hobbes admits 
that the international realm looks closest to this anarchy, he does not necessarily see 
international law or order absent at the global level.   
International Constitutionalism 
 Dyzenhaus presents a Hobbes who privileges the rule of law, hence making him a 
theorist of constitutionalism. Dyzenhaus makes the further argument that this emphasis on 
law in Hobbes account is relevant not only at the domestic but at the international level as 
well. This element of constitutionalism is, of course, one part of the ideology of 
constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is the political philosophy that proposes political life 
should be law governed and that no one actor should be able to dominate a political order. A 
constitution is a purposefully constructed political and legal text that sets out the details of 
such a system is to be ordered. Not all constitutional political orders have a written 
constitution and not all constitutions embody the norms of constitutionalism. The written 
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constitution is the product of the 18
th
 century revolutions in the United States and France, 
building on the charters of the English colonies in America and the Dutch republic of the 17
th
 
century. Hobbes is usually not seen as a theorist of constitutionalism, for he resisted efforts to 
divide and limit the sovereign, though Dyzenhaus makes the case that his focus on the rule of 
law is evidence enough for a constitutional reading. Indeed, this legalistic reading has 
become the more prominent theorization of constitutionalism in recent years, perhaps best 
represented in the work of Ronald Dworkin, whose emphasis on rights and judicial review 
has structured much of the legalism around constitutional theory (Dworkin 1977).7 
 Outside of this rule of law constitutionalism, Larry May provides another reading of 
Hobbes that points to the potential for a political reading of his constitutional theory. May, 
drawing on the Dialogue and other elements of Hobbes’ corpus, makes two relevant 
arguments in relation to constitutionalism. First, he explores Hobbes social contract theory, in 
which he differentiates a social contract from a constitutional one. The former is a contract 
made among those who live in a natural state of potential conflict, and their agreement to 
constitute a political order requires all to consent to join. The latter, though, is closer to what 
we would think of as a constitutional arrangement. This is a contract that stipulates more 
clearly what kind of governing order should exist. May locates this distinction in the 
difference between Chapters 17 and 18 of Leviathan, in which the former chapter clarifies 
how a commonwealth arises from a multitude and the latter chapter clarifies the kinds of 
powers that the constituted sovereign holds. Most interpretations of Hobbes do not highlight 
this distinction, but May nicely brings out the point that while each individual must consent 
to the construction of the commonwealth, not all are necessary to the specifics of what he 
calls the ‘constitutional contract’ (May 2013: 48-66). 
 The limit on the sovereign, though, comes not from the constitutional contract alone 
but from the concept of equity. May argues that this concept is central for Hobbes’ idea of a 
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moral limit placed on the sovereign than is the concept of justice. For every reader of Hobbes 
knows that justice is defined by the sovereign and can only be found in the positive laws that 
the sovereign passes. But equity, as May presents it, is the procedural dimension of fairness 
that comes out most clearly in the Dialogue. May suggests that Hobbes found in the Courts of 
Equity that existed in England in his day a model for how a court might exist to hear 
complaints against the sovereign. The idea of equity does not override the sovereign, but only 
serves to ‘correct’ him, a point that Hobbes makes to differentiate his view from Edward 
Coke, the champion of the common law against which Hobbes positions the Dialogue (May 
2013: 79). Yet this corrective role is an important one, according to May, for it does place 
important limits on the sovereign’s actions. May argues that equity is primarily a principle of 
procedure, a point that he argues makes Hobbes’ view on law and politics similar to Lon 
Fuller’s quasi-natural law theory (May 2013: 137-138).  
 These two elements of May’s argument, the idea of a constitutional contract and the 
idea of equity, come together in his reflections on Hobbes and international law and 
institutions. May’s book concludes with a defence of Hobbes as a theorist of international law 
and institutions against the views of those realists who only quote the famous sentence from 
Chapter 13 in which states are nothing more than gladiators facing off with each. May argues 
that even this passage allows space for an association of states that might seek to provide for 
the welfare of their peoples (May 2013: 182-183). This space is constrained, of course, for it 
is composed of states rather than being a commonwealth of peoples. As such, May continues 
in this vein to argue that international law, made by states, and international institutions, 
composed of states, can both be justified in accordance with Hobbes’ theories. Moreover, the 
centrality of equity in May’s interpretation gives him resources to justify an international 
legal code governing the conduct of war, such as that found in the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions and enforceable (to some extent) in the International Criminal Court.  
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 We can connect May’s account with the emphasis that Hobbes places on peace. As 
noted above, the first natural law listed by Hobbes in Leviathan is that all men should seek 
peace. The state is constructed, according to this reading, for this primary purpose, that of 
creating a peaceful political order. While realists tend not to highlight this element of 
Hobbes’ thought, it is directly relevant to the construction of international law and 
institutions. One need only look at the United Nations Charter to see how central peace. 
Bardo Fassbender has argued that the UN Charter provides a kind of proto-global 
constitutional text, and he highlights the centrality of peace as the master concept in reading 
that text (Fassbender 2009). While Fassbender does not draw on Hobbes, we can certainly 
make the link between the emphasis on peace in Hobbes theories and the way in which 
international law and institutions privilege this idea.   
 May’s account of Hobbes leads to what I would call an international 
constitutionalism, or one in which states are the primary agents, authorized to protect their 
citizens through the construction of Leagues and laws that govern their relations. This 
provides us with a further step toward seeing Hobbes as a theorist of global constitutionalism. 
Yet, in order to make the step toward a truly global constitutional order, we need to move 
beyond the international constitutionalism toward something more deeply integrated into the 
individual lives of those who inhabit the globe. This step might seem impossible in 
accordance with Hobbes’ theories, for he does not seem interested in the role of individuals 
but only in the role of the institutions designed to protect individuals from each other. But, 
one further reading of Hobbes which privileges the individual and connects that 
individualism to a critical form of liberalism, can provide us with the resources we need to 
move toward a global constitutional order.   
Global Constitutionalism 
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 Thus far, I have argued that Hobbes theory of law rests on a clearly defined 
conception of authority. Hobbes’ emphasis on authority does not lead to dictatorship or 
authoritarianism (though it might) but rather relies on the rule of law in order for true political 
authority and order to come about. The link between authority and law makes a turn to 
constitutionalism possible, for it is a constitution that brings together the political and the 
legal. Hobbes, as noted above, does not easily fit into liberal constitutionalism, though, for he 
eschews any separation of powers in order to limit the government, which he believes would 
lead to a descent into chaos and anarchy. Larry May’s reading of Hobbes suggests how we 
might see some limits placed on the sovereign, through the idea of equity and a reading of the 
social contract as a constitutional contract. Along with the importance of peace, we can find 
in Hobbes a theorist of international constitutionalism as an extension of international law 
and institutions.  
 Yet there are resources in Hobbes for a different element of constitutionalism, that of 
constituent power, one that can connect Hobbes to what I would argue is a fuller form of 
global constitutionalism. This is an unlikely claim to make, for Hobbes’ theory of the social 
contract comes in a single moment of founding after which individual members of the 
community would seem to fade into a quiescent mass that simply follows their leader. This 
reading of Hobbes does not value that strong individualism at the heart of his theories, an 
individualism that connects in important ways to his legal theory. Moreover, this 
individualism leads to an aspect of Hobbes’ thought that demonstrates the potential for a 
global constitutionalism arising from the purposeful actions of liberal individuals seeking to 
promote and protect forms of order that benefit themselves and others – that is, Hobbes’ 
individualism and theory of self-making provides a foundation for how global constituent 
powers might coalesce into forms of global constitutionalism.  
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 My reading of Hobbes’ individualism comes from Richard Flathman. Flathman has 
developed an account of authority, rights and liberalism that privileges a strong 
individualism. His early work drew upon analytic political philosophy to flesh out key 
concepts in liberal theory, primarily rights and authority (Flathman 1977, 1980). From these 
and other works, he has constructed an account of what he calls ‘wilful liberalism’, a 
liberalism based on a strong individualism that verges on the anarchic but shies away from 
embracing this position fully (Flathman 1989, 1992, 1998). Instead, his liberalism is one in 
which individuals demand justification for authority, assert their rights, and remain 
impenetrable to each other. This fundamental impenetrability, one that results from the 
human condition of being unable to fully understand and appreciate each other, leads not to 
chaos and self-interested behaviour, but in Flathman’s account can lead to a greater respect 
for others, a respect for the rights of others, and a cultivation of a kind of fundamental 
pluralism (Flathman 2005; Honnig and Mapel 2002). As should be evident from these 
themes, Thomas Hobbes has played a crucial role in Flathman’s development of his account 
of liberalism. 
 Flathman’s account of Hobbes brings together many of the themes noted above. 
Rather than transposing contemporary theories onto Hobbes, however, Flathman undertakes a 
thorough reading of Hobbes’ work, across not just the political texts but those in the realm of 
the natural sciences as well. Indeed, it is those works on natural science, particularly on the 
composition of the universe in which we live, that Flathman begins: ‘Hobbes’s writings 
depict a densely material universe pulsating with energy and movement but largely lacking in 
humanly intelligible or serviceable order or purpose’ (Flathman 2002: 1). Whatever order and 
purpose do emerge from this universe, particularly when it comes to those things pertaining 
to the human condition, results from what Flathman calls ‘human making’. This human 
making begins in ourselves, where the passions and rationality work together to construct and 
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make our reality. Unlike many other theorists, for whom the passion must be tamed and 
controlled, Flathman’s Hobbes finds the passions essential for making. They link with 
imagination, a crucial component of our lives, that element which allows us to think across 
new vistas and create new realities. This role for the passions, imagination and reason does 
not necessarily lead to peace and concord, though, but provides a spur to new thinking and 
creative possibilities: ‘[Hobbes] regarded the passions as well as the imagination as essential 
to all effective thought and action and indeed as the dominant party in the perpetually 
unstable array of forces responsible for both peace and disorder, both great achievements and 
horrific failures’ (Flathman 2002: 20). Language, reason and science bring these modes of 
thought and action under some semblance of control, or at least allow us to interact with and 
understand each to some extent. Hobbes believed his theories could give some order to this 
scientific endeavour, for he argued against those who would distort our ability to clarify the 
meaning and scope of scientific inquiry. At the same time, Flathman argues that within 
Hobbes’ efforts there remained a deep scepticism about our ability to understand each other 
even when using the same words and language. This scepticism and lack of understanding is 
not necessarily resolved by giving the Leviathan the ability to define and control meanings, 
though this certainly ameliorates it to some extent.  
 Based on this reading of Hobbes’ natural science, Flathman turns to their relevance 
for political life. Reminding us of Hobbes first two natural laws (Hobbes 1968 [1651]: 190-
193), Flathman contends that there are two modes of self-making possible in Hobbes’ 
account. The more well-known is the creation of the Leviathan, a governmental authority that 
allows for the creation of peace by preventing self-interested persons from harming each 
other. But he highlights the other, individualistic form of self-making that Hobbes proposes. 
Persons must seek to cultivate in themselves certain virtues, ways of being that will allow 
them to live with each other commodiously. For most, this means prudence, a form of 
16 
 
moderation that prevents us from overreaching and harming each other. But for some, there is 
also the cultivation of attributes such as magnanimity, gallantry, and generosity. These forms 
of self-making get less attention in commentaries on Hobbes, but Flathman argues that are 
crucial to undermining the view that Hobbes is a pessimist about human nature. Rather than 
seeing individual humans as evil or bad in their pursuit of their interests, Hobbes wants them 
to cultivate forms of the self that will allow them to pursue their interests but in a way that 
recognizes the reality of a human condition of scarcity and equality of ability to harm others. 
The Leviathan, then, is not the only answer to the problem of the human condition, though it 
is an essential one when individuals to not engage in the forms of self-making that Hobbes 
sees as a way to retain our strong individuality and live with others.  
 Flathman thus finds in Hobbes resources for a strong individualism. Hobbes, he 
concludes, feared democratic governance because it in this form of political life that there is 
the most threat to individualism and liberty. While the monarch may be flawed and thus 
construct a flawed political order, an active and animated demos will encourage the ‘vain-
glorious’ who will seek to appear before all others as most important and hence try to outdo 
each other with activity. 8 For Hobbes, and Flathman, this tendency in democratic life is to be 
feared more than the possibility of a single unconstrained sovereign, whose political reach is 
limited. Rather than turn toward a democratic structure that feeds the competitive spirit in 
public life, Flathman highlights those elements of Hobbes in which education is central. Civic 
education is where forms of character building can take place that might lead to the attributes 
identified as creating more possibilities for peace (Flathman 2002: 154; see also Slomp 2000: 
173). 9  
 One accounts of Hobbes either draw on or parallel Flathman’s reading, both of which 
provide re-readings of the Hobbesian international tradition. Michael Williams draws on 
directly on Flathman in reconsidering IR realism as a form of wilful liberalism, reading 
17 
 
Hobbes, Rousseau and Morgenthau as representative of this idea. Williams disputes the 
realist assumption that the human condition or agents (either persons or states) are inherently 
given. Rather, he proposes, like Hobbes, that agents are made through conscious decision 
making practices that result from recognizing the inability to know each other, that scepticism 
that emerges in Flathman’s reading as well. But this scepticism does not lead to anarchy or 
nihilism in either domestic or international life. Rather, for Hobbes, this scepticism prompts 
us to recognize our ‘limits’ leading to a kind of ‘chastened’ political life (another concept 
drawn from Flathman’s reading – Williams 2005: 49). Williams takes this reading of Hobbes, 
along with Rousseau and Morgenthau, to construct an international politics of limits and 
constrained political action at the global level. This means pursuing interests but without 
certainty, a practice he finds lacking in so much of international politics. 
 A more recent reading of Hobbes also mirrors Flathman’s, though this one does not 
draw on him directly and looks instead to Hobbes theological writings. William Bain, also in 
an effort to rethink Hobbes as a theorist of realism, suggests that he should be read as a 
voluntarist theorist in the medieval theological sense. He highlights how Hobbes’ theology 
relies on a voluntarist God, one who makes and unmakes in accordance with his will and not 
in accordance with a pre-existing natural law or natural reason. In fact, there are no 
connections among things in this world, for they exist in that state of ‘singular existents, 
things that are unrelated in any intrinsic way’ (Bain 2014: 26). The order that exists in nature 
comes from God’s imposition, his decision to create order out of chaos. Hobbes is a theorist 
of anarchy, Bain concludes, but not the anarchy of IR theory. Instead, this is an anarchy that 
invites acts of artifice and making, ways of reclaiming the world. Just as God orders nature, 
so humans can order political life – at either the domestic or global level: ‘So as God imposes 
order on the heavens, fashioning the unity and regularity of the solar system, man imposes 
order on a state of nature composed of individual men, thereby fashioning the unity and 
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regularity of a commonwealth… Man’s creative potential, the ability to construct a stale 
pattern of human intercourse, is what saves him from the unrelenting misery of perpetual 
violence’ (Bain 2014: 27). The individualism of Flathman is not directly invoked here, but a 
parallel account can be found in his defence of the singularity of existence, one that can only 
be tamed by God in the natural world and the human person in the political world.  
 In both Bain and Williams we see how some of the themes that Flathman has 
developed in his reading might be applicable at the global level. From all three, we find a 
theorist of artifice and making, a theorist who suggests that only when we take control of our 
lives and provide the order we need can there be peace. This wilful liberalism, strong 
individualism, and sceptical theory of limits leads can lead us to law and institution making. 
Just as in domestic political life we make the Leviathan to constrain and control us, so in 
global political life we can make and construct similar institutional structures. 
To bring this discussion back to global constitutionalism, one might consider different 
elements of self-making at the global level that can fruitfully draw on Flathman’s reading of 
Hobbes. The creative and imaginative dimension that Flathman draws from Hobbes might be 
helpful in thinking about imaginative alternatives to the current international order. For 
instance, the recent argument of James Tully that on global citizenships provides one 
possibility. Tully has long been a creative and insightful interpreter of John Locke, who, 
along with Hobbes, helped shape our understanding of rights in a liberal order  (Tully 1993). 
But he critically reads Locke and the entire tradition of Western constitutional theory, as 
failing to account for alternative communal formulations, ones that do not allow for a 
plurality of voices at the global level (Tully 1995). His political theory of citizenship then 
begins in liberalism, but expands it outward. In particular, Tully reads efforts to engage with 
environmental issues and concerns as evidence of a new kind of citizenship, what he calls 
‘diverse citizenship’ and which locates at the intersection of the local and the global (Tully 
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2014). Creatively, Tully sees these efforts at self-making as leading to a new form of 
citizenship, something that can contribute to a global political and legal order. Tully does not 
draw on Hobbes, but I read in his efforts the kind of political practice and self-making I have 
drawn from Flathman’s reading of Hobbes. This global citizenship connects to some 
important strands in the literature on global constitutionalism, though it is also distinctive in 
that it provides a new way to see the role of the individual in the global order. 
One might also read into this Hobbes of making and artifice as a theorist who can help 
connect back to May’s defense of international constitutionalism. For May, Hobbes provides 
us a philosophical defense of such institutions and legal frameworks as limits on sovereign 
states. While I find this reading persuasive, I think May’s account can be pushed even further 
in that individuals must play the role of making and creating when new institutions need to be 
created. For instance, though there are many theories that explain the creation of the 
European Union, one cannot ignore the crucial role played by creative diplomats such as Jean 
Monnet, whose efforts and vision was essential to seeing the European Coal and Steel 
Community as more than simply a functionalist means for ensuring energy supplies in 
Europe in the immediate post war era. The creative act of making new institutions continues 
as is evidenced by the role of international lawyers and diplomats in the creation of the 
International Criminal Court through the invocation of the Rome Conference in 1998. Anne 
Marie Slaughter suggests that this institution, along with many others, arose from individuals 
engaged in the construction of networks of information sharing and harmonization that 
enabled jurists, diplomats and politicians to come together to form a new element of the 
international judicial architecture (Slaughter 2004: 148-150). 
Finally, it is important to remember the ‘chastened’ dimension of Hobbes’ ideas about 
law and politics. Hobbes is not Kant, as he does not envision a progressive enlightenment of 
the human condition such that it will recognize the importance of law and justice at the 
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domestic than global levels. Rather, Hobbes recognizes the dangers of the human condition, 
though he should not be read as a simple theorist of a sinful human nature causing these 
problems. Instead, Hobbes believes we can continually make and remake our institutions to 
achieve the peace and concord necessary for our shared life to continue. Williams helpfully 
reminds us that there are strands in realist thought that are not simplistic dismissals of the 
possibility of cooperation and peace, but that we can have a chastened perspective on global 
political life. This means not believing that each and every new institution or legal 
development will create universal peace and justice. It means, instead, being aware of the 
problems of political life but not abandoning the possibility of making and remaking our 
political lives at the domestic and global levels.  
Conclusion 
 This article began with the idea that Thomas Hobbes might be more helpful in 
understanding global constitutionalism than he is normally seen to be. Rather than a 
pessimistic theorist of a flawed human condition, the reading I have undertaken here presents 
Hobbes as a theorist of making and artifice, one who privileges the individual as the source 
and potential for new institutions in political life. Building on Dyzenhaus’ primary on the rule 
of law, May’s emphasis on equity in international law and institutions, and Flathman’s 
emphasis on self-making and individualism, I have found in Hobbes an able defender of a 
form of global constitutionalism. It is certainly not a simplistic global constitutionalism, but a 
nuanced and chastened one, one that grows out law, institutions, and individuals and finds in 
the practices and activities of individuals around the world a potential for a new global 
political and legal order.  
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Notes 
1- See, for instance, Charles Beitz use of Hobbes (1999). 
2- Though some have argued for a more realist cosmopolitanism; for examples, see 
Beardsworth 2013  and Hayden 2005. 
3- My ideas about authority are largely shaped by two works; Richard Flathamn’s book 
(1980) and Hannah Arendt’s essay (1961). For my use of them, along with Hobbes 
and Locke, see Lang 2014: 20-42. 
4- See Gabriella Slomp’s article in this special edition for an argument as to how counsel 
is an essential part of the law making process. 
5- Of course, Howard Warrender argued for a different foundation for obligation in 
Hobbes, one based on divinely based natural law (Warrender 1957). Obligation is 
more complex than I am presenting it here, of course; one might also argue that once 
the sovereign fails in his obligation to provide peace, the members of society are no 
longer obligated to obey him. The basis of obligation in Hobbes is not my central 
concern here, though, so I will not explore this in any depth. 
6- Tom Sorell’s contribution to this special edition makes a strong case for an undivided 
sovereign as the central  message of Hobbes’ thinking on law and politics. Patricia 
Springborg, in her reading of the Elements, also makes such an argument. 
7- For a critical response to this legalism, there has been an effort to construct what is 
called political constitutionalism, which highlights the importance of legislatures, law 
making and republicanism as opposed to the legal liberalism of Dworkin and others 
(Bellamy 2008). 
8- Gabriella Slomp argues that the politics of glory is a crucial and yet under explored 
element of Hobbes thought. Interestingly, she also finds in Hobbes a strong 
individualism, though her analysis points in other directions than Flathmans; Slomp 
2000. 
9- Michael Williams develops a parallel account of Hobbes in his construction of the 
realist tradition in international relations; see Williams 2005. 
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